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Abstract 
Until recently, philosophers and psychologists conceived of emotions as brain- and body-bound 
affairs. But researchers have started to challenge this internalist and individualist orthodoxy. A 
rapidly growing body of work suggests that some emotions incorporate external resources and 
thus extend beyond the neurophysiological confines of organisms; some even argue that 
emotions can be socially extended and shared by multiple agents. Call this the extended 
emotions thesis (ExE). In this article, we consider different ways of understanding ExE in 
philosophy, psychology, and the cognitive sciences. First, we outline the background of the 
debate and discuss different argumentative strategies for ExE. In particular, we distinguish ExE 
from cognate but more moderate claims about the embodied and situated nature of cognition and 
emotion (section 1). We then dwell upon two dimensions of ExE: emotions extended by material 
culture and by the social factors (section 2). We conclude by defending ExE against some 
objections (section 3) and point to desiderata for future research (section 4). 
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Defenders of the extended mind thesis (ExM) argue that some cognitive processes like thinking, 
planning, and navigating our environment extend beyond the head. Features of our environment 
drive and thus partially constitute some of these processes. Might emotions be similarly 
extended?  
 Until recently, most emotion researchers assumed that emotions supervene on processes 
inside an individual’s brain and body. But some now question this internalist and individualist 
orthodoxy. An increasing number of researchers argue that some emotions incorporate external 
resources so deeply that they can be said to extend beyond brain and body; some even argue that 
emotions can be socially extended and shared by multiple agents. Call this the extended 
emotions thesis (ExE).  
Recent decades have seen an increased philosophical interest in emotions. ExE can play an 
important role in broadening the scope of this renewed interest. While a relatively new area of 
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research, ExE has already garnered much interest—in part because it picks up on themes that 
have been present in other disciplines such as social psychology and sociology for some time. 
Although its origins are philosophical, ExE is, as we’ll see, poised to bring philosophy into 
contact with some lively interdisciplinary debates. 
 In what follows, we consider different ways of understanding ExE in philosophy and 
cognitive science. First, we do some background work and distinguish ExM and ExE from 
similar but more moderate claims about the embodied and situated nature of mind. Next, we look 
at different ways of arguing for ExM and ExE. We then consider two dimensions of ExE: 
emotions extended by features of material culture and the social world. We conclude by briefly 
considering some objections and implications for future research. 
 
1. From Embodied and Situated to Extended Emotions 
Mind in body, mind in world 
In order to properly situate ExM and ExE in the philosophical landscape, note first that ExM and 
ExE are compatible with—but nevertheless distinct from—two other claims. These are claims 
about the embodied (Shapiro, 2011) and situated (Robbins and Ayedale, 2009) nature of mind.  
From an embodied perspective, aspects of cognition and emotion depend on—and can be 
co-constituted by—not just brain processes but also bodily processes and the dynamics of our 
embodied agency. The embodied emotion thesis, in particular, is fueled by studies suggesting 
that emotional episodes are partially composed of perceptual, motoric, autonomic, and 
somatovisceral processes—a range of bodily components at work beyond the brain (for 
overviews, see Colombetti, 2014; Damasio, 1994; Davidson 2009; Kever et al 2016; Laird 2007; 
Niedenthal 2007). Recent debates have also focused on how emotional appraisal—at one time 
thought to be a distinctively cognitive component (Solomon 1976)—depends on extra-neural 
bodily processes (Barlassina and Newen 2013; Colombetti 2007; Maiese 2014). 
  From this perspective, one might say that emotions are bodily extended in that the 
vehicles of emotional phenomena span neural and extra-neural processes. But this is neither a 
new nor a philosophically controversial idea. In addition to many contemporary adherents, the 
embodied emotions thesis has received a great deal of support in the history of philosophy.  
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(Colombetti and Thompson 2008; Stephan et al 2014). What’s important to note, rather, is that 
the embodied emotions thesis is distinct from ExE. While it shares ExE’s commitment to the 
claim that vehicles of emotion span neural and extra-neural components, the latter are 
nevertheless thought to be biological components wholly inside the individual.    
A situated perspective is likewise in the vicinity of ExM and ExE although importantly 
distinct from it. From a situated perspective, cognition and emotion are inextricably embedded in 
rich networks of environmental (biological, sociocultural, material) scaffolding that make an 
ongoing contribution to their nature and functioning. Agents actively manipulate this scaffolding 
in order to boost thinking and intelligent action by reducing cognitive load (Clark 1995, pp.59-
67; Kirsh 1995). A situated approach to emotions might characterize emotional displays as 
skillful and adaptive processes of modulating others’ behavior by sending social signals designed 
to convey appraisals, elicit specific responses, and coordinate joint actions (Griffiths and 
Scarantino, 2009; Wiltusky 2015). Smiles, for example, are more often performed when 
interacting with others than when alone (Fernández-Dols et al. 1995).  
From this perspective, the environment makes an active contribution to the performance 
of cognitive processes; it provides an ongoing flow of task-relevant information affecting both 
processing and responsive behavior. However, a situated perspective generally doesn’t 
characterize the environment or the information it harbors as literally constituting part of the 
cognitive or emotional process.1 While sensitive to the complex dynamics interlacing mind and 
world, a situated perspective is nevertheless—like an embodied perspective—consistent with an 
individualistic and internalist view of cognition and emotions.2 
  
Mind outside the head: Arguing for ExM and ExE 
In contrast to embodied and situated perspectives, ExM and ExE argue that cognition and 
emotions can extend beyond brain and body. In these cases, parts of the world set up, drive, and 
regulate some cognitive and emotional processes and thus ought to be considered proper parts of 
                                                          
1 Griffiths and Scarantino (2009: 448), for instance, are clear that their situated view does not commit them to an 
extended account of emotions. 
2 See Stephan et al. (2014: 70-73) for further discussion of a situated or “embedded” approach to emotions and why 
it’s distinct from ExE. 
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these processes. There are generally said to be two waves of ExM arguments in the literature 
(Sutton 2010): The first involves the so-called ‘parity principle’ (PP); the second emphasizes the 
complementarity and integration (or “coupling”) of internal and external processes as they form 
extended systems.3  
First-wave PP approaches stress the functional similarity of internal and external 
processes. The idea is that:    
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it 
done in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive 
process, then that part of the world is […] part of the cognitive process. (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998: 8) 
Clark and Chalmers provide several cases to motivate PP. The most famous involves Otto, an 
individual with memory loss due to Alzheimer’s. Otto writes down all new information he 
acquires in his ever-present notebook, which he regularly uses to perform various cognitive tasks 
like remembering the location of MoMA. For PP, the notebook is part of the vehicle by which 
Otto realizes both his occurrent and his dispositional memories. It plays the same functional role 
that Otto’s bio-memory does vis-à-vis his thought and behavior, and thus there’s no principled 
reason for withholding it legitimate cognitive status.      
Critics have attacked PP in a number of ways that need not concern us here (see sec. 3). 
What’s more important is that these criticisms highlight an apparent weakness of PP in terms of 
how best to characterize the relationship between individuals and their cognitive artifacts. By 
focusing entirely on coarse-grained functional similarity, PP seems to overlook explanatorily 
significant structural and functional differences between internal and external resources. These 
differences are of particular interest to interdisciplinary approaches to mind, which are concerned 
with teasing out idiosyncratic effects different artifacts have on dimensions of our cognitive and 
affective life (Sutton 2010). Since ExE is motivated by interdisciplinary approaches sensitive to 
these differences, a conceptual tool other than PP is needed. 
                                                          
3 Kirchhoff (2012) lays the groundwork for a third wave emphasizing the role that enculturation and patterned 
practices play in transforming the brain’s representational capacities.  
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 We find several tools in second wave “integration”-based ExM arguments (Menary, 
2007; Rowlands, 1999; Sutton 2010). These arguments turn parity objections on their head by 
embracing idiosyncratic differences between internal and external resources. They’re also 
concerned with exploring details of how users exploit and interact with these differences. From 
this integrationist perspective, the focus should be on clarifying how these differences work 
together (i.e., integrate) in driving intelligent thought, action, and emotion.  
 To make this complementarity and integrationist view concrete, consider memory. As 
Merlin Donald (1991) argues, it’s precisely because external memory devices within material 
culture—“exograms” like written records, measuring systems, and other artifacts—work 
differently than biological modes of remembering that the former are poised to complement and 
integrate with the latter. For example, in contrast to internal bio-memories, external memories in 
notebooks or smartphone apps can be reformatted, are relatively permanent, have nearly-
unlimited storage capacity, and offer multiple paths of access and retrieval. When users engage 
with these external devices, the integration of internal and external resources working together 
enables them to realize augmented forms of memory the brain simply can’t achieve on its own. 
Similar benefits are can be found in the social world—for example, when individuals off-load 
some processes of recall onto others and groups collectively pool their resources to construct 
shared episodic memories (Harris et al 2014; Huebner 2016).    
To return to ExE: as will become clear, the format and dynamics of external emotional 
resources matter. Different kinds of resources—whether found in material culture or the social 
world—have different properties, formats, and functions, and thus invite different forms of 
engagement, integration, and emotional enhancement.  
    
2.  Types and Components of Emotions 
Proponents of ExE face at least two significant explanatory challenges. First, the realm of 
emotions and affectivity is very broad, from fleeting bodily feelings to long-running moods or 
emotional dispositions. Despite this diversity, however, ExE proponents have so far failed to 
adequately distinguish claims about the possibility of extending various properties, components 
or types of different emotional and affective phenomena. A complete defense of ExE (beyond 
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the scope of this discussion) thus requires not just a consideration of how paradigmatic emotional 
states like fear, anger, sadness, or joy might be extended, but also affective phenomena 
comprised of different components and temporal profiles: bodily affects, existential feelings, 
moods, temperaments, sentiments, character traits, dispositions, and the like. This is a tall order, 
one that has not yet been met in the ExE literature (although see Colombetti and Roberts 2015 
and Stephan et al 2014 for some taxonomic considerations). 
 Second, ExE must also deal with the structural complexity of emotions. Emotions are 
multidimensional phenomena. And this structural complexity presents challenges in terms of 
specifying which parts of emotions are extended, when this occurs, and how integration with 
external resources realizes this extension.    
How one begins to answer these questions turns on the model of emotions one accepts. 
According to Scherer’s (2005) influential “component process model”, emotions consist of five 
components: (i) an evaluative cognitive component (appraisal); (ii) a neurophysiological 
component (e.g., bodily symptoms); (iii) a motivational component (action tendencies); (iv) 
expressive motor components (e.g., facial and vocal expressions, mimicry); and (v) a subjective 
feeling component (experience). James Gross (2002, 2014) and others have recently argued that 
emotions are also constituted by a regulative component through which one initiates, inhibits, or 
modulates various components of an emotional episode.   
 Various attempts have been made to show how some of these different components might 
extend. For example, Krueger (2012) summons different sources of empirical support to argue 
that expressive components (facial expressions, gestures, etc.) constitute proper parts of some 
emotions and thus extend them beyond the head. Carter et al. (forthcoming) take a different tack 
and maintain that the most plausible candidate for extension is the non-conscious cognitive 
appraisal component. They argue that if some cognitive processes extend into the world—and 
some of these processes feature in appraisals that cognitivists like Nussbaum (2001) and 
Solomon (1988) argue are essential to emotions—then some emotions will be extended. 
However, this argument for ExE is based on cognitivist assumptions about emotions not shared 
by everybody in the debate (Scarantino, 2010).  
 Huebner (2011) similarly adopts a cognitivist and functionalist approach in arguing that 
emotions and moods can extend across collectives by the right sort of computational scaffolding. 
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According to this view, emotions are essentially “tools for representing the world in particular 
ways” (113). The representational function of an emotion for Huebner is dissociable from its 
experiential aspect—and he argues further that there is no principled reason why such 
representational information (which may be non-conscious) cannot be socially distributed across 
individuals via technology or other means. 
 What about extending emotion’s experiential component? Some proponents of ExM are 
wary of extended consciousness (e.g., Clark 2009; but see Ward 2012). Likewise, some 
otherwise friendly to ExE are nevertheless skeptical of extended emotional consciousness 
(Stephan et al. 2014; Sterelny 2010). However, this hesitation may rest on a tacit internalism 
about emotional experience: namely, as comprised of a detachable inside-the-head ‘feeling’ 
component functionally isolated from its other (potentially extended) components. But there may 
be reasons to resist this internalism by acknowledging an inextricable, mutually supporting 
relation between emotion’s experiential, expressive, and regulative components (Frijda, 1986; 
Tomkins, 1984). An emerging trend in ExE literature (explored in more detail below) is, 
accordingly, to argue that the experiential dimension of emotions can be extended via external 
resources that scaffold these expressive and regulative dimensions.  
With this background in place, we now turn to a more focused consideration of ExE. We 
consider two dimensions along which ExE proponents argue emotions might be extended: 
emotions extended by (1) material culture, and (2) socially extended emotions.   
 
 
3. Dimension of ExE 
ExE and Material Culture 
There is a close connection between emotion regulation and material culture.4 In everyday life 
we manipulate artifacts and spaces in order to manipulate our emotional phenomenology. We 
play music, turn lights up or down, paint walls with specific colors, drink wine, burn incense, or 
                                                          
4 See Malafouris (2013) for a more general discussion of ExM and material culture. 
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wear specific items of clothing in order to evoke and sustain specific affective experiences 
(Colombetti and Krueger, 2015).  
 But not all of these manipulations count as extended emotions. After a long day at work, 
Inga might come home and light a few candles to create a soothing atmosphere. But the candles 
aren’t necessarily part of Inga’s ongoing emotional experience. The causal relation here is 
unidirectional: from world (candles) to Inga. Her response to the soothing qualities of the 
candlelight need not affect a material change in the environment. Accordingly, Inga hasn’t 
integrated with the affectively salient properties of candles in any sense relevant to ExE. 
However, there are more philosophically interesting cases of emotion regulation that do seem to 
involve genuine subject-world integration—bi-directional engagements with material culture 
whereby external resources take over and govern regulative dynamics in an ongoing way.  
From the perspective of ExE, these cases of materially-scaffolded regulations are good 
candidates for emotional extension. They are examples where a subject becomes part of what 
Wilson (2010) refers to as a functionally integrated, gainful system (hereafter, FIG). FIGs have 
three dimensions: they consist of processes that are (1) coupled, in that they are linked by 
reliable causal connections; (2) integrated, in that they are mutually-influencing and working 
together as one; and (3) functionally gainful, in that these processes together realize novel 
functions they can’t realize separately.   
Philosophers and musicologists alike argue that making music is a good example of a 
FIG (Borgo, 2011; Clark, 2008: 24; Cochrane, 2008; Colombetti and Roberts, 2015; Geeves and 
Sutton, 2015; Roberts, 2015). When a musician practices with her instrument, we might 
characterize this engagement as an ongoing process of emotional self-stimulation: physical 
qualities of the instrument and auditory properties of the produced sound (tempo, intensity, 
volume, etc.) coax specific emotional responses out of the listener and regulate the quality and 
dynamics of her experience in real-time—experiences that affect what she plays next, which 
regulate her further emotional experiences, etc. When actively integrated with her instrument, the 
musician may be able to realize emotional experiences with a particular intensity, depth, and 
diachronic character that are possible only when she is part of this materially-extended musical 
feedback loop. The physical basis of her experience is the activity realized in this feedback loop 
considered as a whole.  
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What about music listening? We routinely use music to regulate our emotions 
(Saarikallio 2011). Yet it might seem that music listening is a paradigm case of unidirectional 
(i.e., world to subject) causal relations. We play music and it impacts our emotional 
consciousness. But we don’t affect any change in the music itself—an environmental 
manipulation needed to establish the integrative dimension of a FIG. However, a closer look at 
the sensorimotor dynamics coupling our listening experiences with our listening technologies 
shows things may not be this simple (Clarke, 2005; Krueger, 2014; Witek, 2013). 
First, musical engagements are always mediated by material culture (DeNora, 2000). 
Music is materialized in technologies that afford ongoing manipulation. And these technologies 
are ultraportable: MP3 players and ubiquitous streaming services mean that listeners—like Otto 
and his notebook—can be coupled to their music as often and as long as they wish. The first 
dimension of a FIG is satisfied.  
How might listener and music become actively integrated? The materiality of our music 
listening technologies means that we can manipulate music in real-time and, in so doing, 
manipulate our emotional experience (Skånland, 2013). We construct playlists and juxtapose 
artists, genres, and individual tracks, depending on our mood. We can even manipulate the 
auditory properties of the piece themselves (volume, treble, bass, etc.) within different listening 
contexts (headphones, speakers, etc.) in order to intentionally evoke a different array of 
emotional motor responses. The physical structure of our listening artifacts and their 
manipulations are part of our repertoire of everyday listening practices (Krause et al 2015). 
Thinking of music as material culture thus highlights how music is something that can be 
manipulated in all sorts of user-specific ways—crucially, with a modulatory impact on our 
emotional experience. Our musical manipulations loop back onto us and shape our future 
manipulations and responsive behavior (Windsor and de Bézenac, 2012). Accordingly, it seems 
that, as with the musician and her instrument, these cases are similar instances of emotional self-
stimulation. Via iterative cycles of motor entrainment and synchronization that unfold in 
response to musical dynamics, auditory properties of the music directly modulate a cascade of 
emotion-specific neural and physiological responses, coaxing emotions out of us and regulating 
their dynamics in real-time as they unfold over short and long-term listening episodes (Elvers 
2016; Fritz el al., 2013; Lundqvist, 2009; Witek et al., 2014). And these musical feedback loops 
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seed functional gain. When coupled with our musical artifacts, we gain access to self-regulatory 
and emotional capacities—for example, as Cochrane (2008) argues, an expanded 
phenomenological repertoire reflecting the expressive subtlety and richness of the music—that 
would remain otherwise inaccessible. Some argue that we are motivated to enact these musical 
couplings from birth (Haslbeck, 2014; Krueger, 2013a; Teckenberg-Jansson et al., 2011).  
 Several musicologists and philosophers defend a picture of music and ExM from a 
slightly different perspective. Kersten (2014), for example, draws on Gibson’s ecological 
psychology to defend a view of music perception as an extended computational system (cf. 
Clarke, 2005; Matyja and Schhiavio, 2013). But these approaches, while helpful for allies of 
ExM, say little of musical emotions. Highlighting the relation between musical responsiveness 
and material culture, however, illuminates why music continues to be a potent cross-cultural 
resource for extending emotions—and it further clarifies why music has thus far been a central 
topic in ExE debates.  
But defenders of ExE need not limit their analysis to music. There are other cases where 
processes of emotion regulation appear to be partially off-loaded onto the environment in that 
they loop through our ongoing interactions with different parts of our material culture: e.g., items 
of clothing and accessories like handbags (Kaufmann, 2011), religious artifacts (Krueger, 
forthcoming), the “affective atmospheres” of corporate spaces (Slaby, 2016) or music and dance 
guided therapy sessions (Maiese, 2016). Because the format and dynamics of these external 
resources are different than neural resources, they are poised to open up new modes of emotion 
experience and expression. And to characterize these extended regulatory processes as 
exclusively internal, ExE proponents suggest, is to ignore their dynamically decentered 
character—that is, the extent to which the individual’s endogenous resources are no longer the 
sole locus of emotional control. 
 
ExE and the social world 
Others have turned to the social world to defend ExE. Discussions here concern the way 
emotions may be said to extend along two different levels of sociality: the face-to-face 
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interpersonal level, as well as a more complex collective level involving group, intergroup, and 
habitualized sociocultural processes (Slaby, 2014; Parkinson et al., 2007).  
Consider first the interpersonal versions of ExE, typically involving dyadic or face-to-face 
encounters between persons. Paradigm cases here are infant-caretaker interactions with close 
body contact. Because they lack endogenous mechanisms for attentional control, perceptual 
discrimination, or emotion regulation (e.g., regulating distress), young infants depend upon 
ongoing input from caregivers to realize cognitive and emotional function. This input is 
primarily provided not by material culture but by bodily interactions and vocal exchanges with 
caretakers. For example, a growing body of research has shown that by using different strategies 
to arouse, downplay or regulate the emotions of infants—smiling, vocal modifications, singing, 
caressing, diverting or guiding attention upon objects of distress, etc.—infants and caretakers 
tightly integrate their affective displays and realize emotional convergence (Krueger, 2013b). 
This is an instance of a co-regulatory process encompassing both infant and caretaker. Modes of 
emotional consciousness and self-regulatory function emerge between the two that are unique to 
this dyadic context (Taipale, 2016; Tronick, 1998). Consequently, social extensions of the 
expressive and regulative components of emotion can modulate or even determine the very way 
emotions ‘feel like’.  
This sort of interpersonally extended co-regulation, or “mutual affect”, is not limited to 
infant-caregiver interactions but might also arise between two and more adults: a group of 
friends, romantic couples, or dance partners. For example, interpersonal off-loading of motor 
control in the rhythmic adaption to the movements of others in dancing can not only functionally 
enhance self-regulation but also generate emotional feedback loops on the fine-grained quality 
and depth of the very emotional experience of the involved subjects (Merritt, 2013). In some 
cases, they may trigger or even create genuinely new, emergent types or tokens of emotions 
(Varga & Krueger, 2013; Krueger, 2014a; Varga, forthcoming) 
A much-discussed example of shared grief can illustrate this idea (Scheler, 1913/26; cf. 
Stephan et al., 2014; Schmid, 2014; Zahavi, 2015; Krueger, 2016; Szanto, forthcoming a; Léon, 
Szanto and Zahavi, forthcoming). The phenomenologists Max Scheler asks us to imagine a 
father and a mother standing together beside the dead body of their child. As they gaze at the 
child’s corpse, both parents experience ongoing sequences of bodily-expressive feedback from 
the other: clenched muscles, held hands, the feel of the other’s body wracked with quiet heaving, 
Forthcoming in Philosophy Compass. 
 
12 
 
the gasps, sobs, and sounds of their mutual weeping, etc. Both partners have direct perceptual 
and tactile access to the grief of the other—expressions that in turn feed back onto, permeate, and 
directly modulate their own grief. Additionally, both partners share a common emotional focus 
(their dead child) and its deeply negative appraisal (sorrow)—as well as a common stock of 
shared memories, experiences, and associations that define the narrative history of their time 
with their child. The child’s parents are thus affectivity integrated with one another at multiple 
levels and times-scales. For Scheler, this is a case of dyadically extended co-regulation that 
generates a shared emotion (grief) extending across both partners. Part of their experience of 
grief will be to feel the same emotion, toward the same object (their child), with the same or very 
similar intensity, and for the same reasons. Accordingly, they will experience their grief not as 
mine and your grief but rather as our grief—that is, as an interpersonally extended emotion. 
 Secondly, consider ExE on a group- or socio-cultural level. Since there is much 
confusion concerning these domains in the literature, often mixing up heterogeneous phenomena, 
it is useful to further distinguish between different mechanisms and types of affective extension:  
 (a) On the one hand, there are socio-psychological mechanisms pertaining to social 
identification and the psychological dynamics of intergroup relations. Consider how events 
concerning our own groups affect us personally and are of different emotional import than those 
concerning other groups. This may be because we are emotionally indifferent to other groups, or 
out-right hostile, thus establishing affective in-group/out-group biases or divides (Parkinson et 
al., 2005). (b) On the other hand, social variants of ExE will involve also genuinely collective 
dimensions. The question here is whether emotions may be attributed not only along social 
boundaries and group divides but, rather, to collectives, corporations or nations as such. This 
research area builds on, but is different from earlier (Le Bon or Durkheim inspired) as well as 
contemporary social-psychological research on emotional contagion, automatic spreading of 
affects, their role for intra-group bonding, or crowd-dynamics such as mass hysteria (Hatfield et. 
al., 2014; Kelly et al., 2014). Moreover, the most interesting examples of also morally and 
politically relevant emotions have been discussed outside ExE research, in particular by 
sociologists (Stets and Turner, 2014), social psychologists (Smith et al., 2007), political 
philosophers and political scientists (Goodwin et al., 2001; Bar-Tal et al., 2007; Nussbaum, 
2013). However, to re-assess these phenomena within ExE research would yield very interesting 
new results. Paradigm examples may include analyses of collective grief, e.g., in the wake of 
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natural catastrophes, terrorism or other national traumata (Curci and Luminet, 2006), collective 
pride or self-esteem, such as patriotism, jubilatory emotions in the context of national sports 
events (Ehrenreich, 2007; Harth et al., 2008; Gilbert, 2009a; Nussbaum, 2013; Sullivan, 2014, 
2015), and collective guilt or shame concerning genocide (Gilbert, 2002, 2009b; Sheehy, 2006; 
Harth et al., 2008).  
 Another way to differentiate within collective and socio-cultural scaffoldings concerns 
the different temporal and developmental dynamics of social extensions of emotions. On the one 
hand, there are synchronic processes that facilitate the performance and display of particular 
emotional episodes, such as scripts for certain rituals, social venues and sites (e.g., wedding 
‘scripts’, musical arrangements, sports stadia, confessional boxes in a Catholic churches, socio-
technological props like romantic web-platforms (Parkinson et al., 2005, 225ff.; Ben-Ze’ev, 
2004; Illouz 2007), or the presence of peers. One should also mention here social appraisal and 
social referencing, i.e., processes by which one’s own appraisal of an event is delegated or linked 
to others’ appraisal (Klinnert et al., 2013). For example, children will typically find something 
disgusting if they recognize facial expressions of disgust by their caretakers. 
 On the other hand, there are diachronic elements scaffolding the development of 
emotional abilities and repertoires. Think of acquired and eventually internalized ‘emotional 
norms’ or ‘feeling rules’ (‘Big boys don’t cry’) (Hochschild, 1983; von Scheve, 2012). Such 
social ‘validation and legitimization’ of emotions (Rimé, 2009) robustly shape the expression (or 
suppression) as well as the regulation of emotions. Moreover, they co-determine the salience of 
one’s emotional target in the first place. In different socio-cultural contexts, different aspects of 
an object will affect me differently. Consider the way in which social norms, habits and 
conventions determine even such allegedly basic or universal and deeply embodied affective 
appraisals as disgust in the face of nutritional taboos (e.g., eating ‘pets’). But examples of 
similarly robust socio-cultural scaffolding include also cultural institutions, such as the 
confession culture of the Catholic Church or psychoanalytic therapy. Illouz (2007) has proposed 
a useful conception in this context, namely a certain ‘emotional habitus’, i.e., internalized and 
internally structuring mechanism of managing one’s own, and influencing others’ emotions, 
which, again, are maintained by cultural, educational and socialization practices. Such 
scaffolding is typically fashioned by gender-roles, social status or role-conferred power and 
affects especially interpersonal emotions such as shame, envy or embarrassment. For instance, 
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whether or not and why somebody is embarrassed or how one displays it, will largely depend on 
one’s social status within a given social context or develop and adapt to different socio-cultural 
settings and particularly to responses of others (Goffman, 1956; Parkinson et al. 2005). 
 Current accounts of ExE primarily discuss the material culture scaffoldings involved on 
the interpersonal and the socio-cultural level of ExE (Colombetti and Krueger, 2015) or the 
technologically aided distribution of emotions across specialized teams, such as a navy-vessel 
navigation crew (Huebner 2011). For example, consider jointly attending to an object or event of 
emotional import with others, such as attending a concert. The fact that I am a co-attendant with 
others in the audience will modify how I perceive and aesthetically respond to the object or 
event, in part because others’ reactive behavior and emotional responses may become 
constituents of my experience. The shared attentional framework in this context will, 
accordingly, co-regulate my individual emotional response. In other words, it may function as an 
external scaffolding expanding the complexity and character of my own experience insofar as 
other members of the audience provide regulatory input enabling me to access qualitative 
features of shared musical experiences that are otherwise inaccessible (Krueger, 2014a: 549-550; 
Cochrane 2009).  
 As this example again illustrates, linking the already large body of work on joint attention 
(e.g. Eilan et al., 2005; Seemann, 2011) and on co-regulation with ExE might significantly 
further research on each and a better understanding of the nature of socio-affective scaffolding 
and social forms of ExE (see León, Szanto, and Zahavi, forthcoming). Others stress the role of 
rather diffuse, emergent group-level phenomena such as ‘emotional atmospheres’ or ‘climates’ 
(Slaby, 2014; Stephan et al., 2014; cf. Rimé, 1991; Rivera and Páez, 2007). However, the social 
extension of emotions in terms of intergroup or social identification has remained unexplored 
within ExE research. Similarly, the constitutive function of robustly habitualized and 
distinctively normative components, such as previously-mentioned emotion norms, has been 
sidelined in the literature on ExE. Finally, much work remains to do in systematically linking 
debates within philosophy on socially extended and properly collective emotions (León, Szanto 
and Zahavi, forthcoming). Arguably, these directions represent fruitful new lines of research. 
Based on the pervious discussion, it seems that a central part of this research will involve a 
detailed analyses of the means, scaffoldings, and mechanism of extended co-regulatory 
processes. 
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3. Objections 
 
While ExM is an increasingly influential view in philosophy of mind, it’s not without its critics. 
Many objections have been offered, some of which are relevant to ExE. We consider three: the 
‘coupling-constitution fallacy’, the ‘cognitive/emotional bloat’ objection, and the ‘mark of the 
cognition/emotions’ objection. 
As indicated, some remain neutral whether developmental and socio-cultural scaffoldings 
ought to be considered as instances of proper extensions or rather only as embedded or situated 
forms of emotions (Griffiths and Scarantino, 2009; Stephan et al., 2014). Echoing the alleged 
coupling-constitution fallacy (CCF) objection to ExM (Adams and Aizawa, 2008), the worry is 
that “an extended-emotion thesis potentially confuses the claim that the environment makes a 
causal contribution to a mental process with the more ontologically demanding claim that it is a 
constituent part of it” (Griffiths and Scarantino, 2009: 448).  
In the face of such cautious neutralism, several points should be considered: first, many 
authors working within the ExM paradigm have already developed compelling responses to CCF 
(e.g., Clark, 2008, 2010; Kagan and Lassiter, 2013; Menary, 2010; Rowlands, 2010; cf. Krueger, 
2012, 2014a). These responses are available to the ExE proponent. Additionally, the ExE 
proponent might say that CCF rests on a mischaracterization of their view. For, ExE does not 
claim that any environmental resource can become a constituent part of an emotion just because 
it makes a causal contribution to, or is coupled with, a particular emotional episode (recall the 
previous discussion of Inga and her candles). Rather, the concept of coupling is meant to specify 
when and why certain material or social resources are thus integrated with an affectively 
endowed agent such that they jointly fulfill a specific emotion-expressive or emotion-regulative 
function—to wit, functions that the agent would or could not perform without being 
appropriately coupled to those external resources.   
This point might also be directed toward those otherwise sympathetic to ExE. Stephan 
and colleagues, for example, write that “without any additional criterion that distinguishes the 
‘interesting’ couplings that give rise to integrated hybrid systems and real extension from those 
‘mere’ couplings where external resources complement the cognitive machinery of a system 
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without literally becoming a part of it, the integrationist’s strategy therefore does not get off the 
ground” (Stephan et al. 2014, 76). ExE proponents might note that this does not license skeptics 
to dismiss any external props as potential candidates for coupling. Instead, it might be productive 
here to adopt Slaby’s (2014) concept of “affective-phenomenal coupling”, which seems broad 
enough to incorporate a variety of emotional scaffoldings, including other people, and yet as a 
heuristic concept is specific enough to indicate that ExE involves more than mere causal 
coupling. 
That said, even those sympathetic to ExE should concede that the concept of coupling 
needs not only substantial disambiguation between causal dependency and functional integration 
but also between ‘social integration’ and ‘phenomenal fusion’ of subjects of experience (Schmid, 
2009, 2014). For the latter task, one might go beyond ExM and ExE debates and look into the 
growing body of work in social ontology and social cognition research. Here we find resources 
to clarify the sense in which collective emotions involve a single, token-identical phenomenal 
subject of those emotions, i.e., some identification or fusion of emotional episodes of 
individuals—or, rather, the maintenance of a self/other-differentiation (Huebner, 2011; Helm, 
2008, 2014; Salmela, 2012, 2014; Schmid, 2014; Szanto, 2015; Zahavi, 2015a, 2015b; Salmela 
and Nagatsu, 2016; Szanto, forthcoming a); Szanto, forthcoming b); León, Szanto, and Zahavi, 
forthcoming). Indeed, one of the central assumptions underlying skepticism regarding collective 
extensions of emotions is that either there is some ineffable phenomenal core to emotional 
experiences that is ‘non-transferable’ from one subject to another, or else that they must fuse into 
one token-identical emotional episode. As a possible reply to this defenders of ExE may first 
point to the inextricability of the different components of emotions, and especially their 
experiential, regulative and expressive components, the latter of which are often extra-
organismic. Moreover, some have even contested that all emotions necessarily have an 
experiential feature, and that one can have emotions that are neither ‘felt’ nor conscious episodes 
(Roberts, 2003). Think of my anger at my boss that I realize to have had in the meeting yesterday 
only after I discuss the incident with my colleagues or my feeling proud of myself, because I 
cognitively assessed my achievement, but without any concomitant sensory, physiological or 
proper affective basis for that emotion. Such affective dissociations might even be more salient 
in collective cases and hence block that objection. A third strategy would be to refer to what 
social psychologists have aptly called the myth of the emotional artichoke (Averill and Nunley, 
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1992; Parkinson et al., 2007; cf. Goldie’s (2000: 85, 99) “avocado pear conception of the 
emotions”). This is the view that whatever socio-cultural shells emotional experiences are 
clothed with, you may peel them away and eventually get to some allegedly non-social 
‘experiential core’, the ‘heart of emotions’. Rejecting this picture provides those who endorse 
ExE and especially the social extension of the experiential aspects of emotions further credit. 
Moreover, when it comes to genuinely shared emotions, mere causal influences will not 
suffice to differentiate these from emotional contagion (Hatfield et al., 2014), or similar social-
psychological feedback dynamics. For example, reference to “contagious euphoria or panic of a 
crowd” (Stephan et al., 2012: 77), or a “contagious demagogue infecting the range of [one’s] 
emotional repertoire” (Slaby 2014: 42), or the somewhat diffuse conceptions of “emotional 
atmospheres” and “climates” (de Rivera, 1992; Rimé, 2007) will rather hinder than help 
explaining what affective coupling really amounts to. By employing these examples—instead of 
what we might call synchronously or diachronically integrated ‘emotional coalitions’, such as 
romantic couples, caretaker-infant pairs, strongly cohesive minorities or groups constituted by 
some salient in-group/out-group affects (Yzerbyt et al., 2003; Seger et al., 2009)—one rather 
obstructs than facilitates to provide any clear-cut criterion for integration. Moreover, mere causal 
coupling of emotions, typical of emotional contagion and affective crowd dynamics, lack any 
robust integration of emotions. Emotional contagion may prevail without any explicit awareness 
of those feedbacks. It will typically occur without any awareness of emotional sharing, and is 
rather accompanied by a fusion or leveling of individual differences of expressive and regulative 
aspects of emotions. 
Next, consider an analogous problem to the ‘problem of cognitive bloat’ or 
‘pancognitivism’ (Adams and Aizawa, 2008, 2010; cf. Clark, 2008; Rowlands, 2010), which 
might be labeled the ‘emotional bloat objection’. The concern is that if we engage in 
‘supersizing’ the affective life of individuals, we may end up ‘superdupersizing’ it (Allen-
Hermanson, 2013) and emotions may ‘ooze’ into everything and everybody and, conversely, 
everything may ‘bleed’ into the affective lives of individuals. However, the ExE proponent 
might once again respond that this worry is unwarranted once we specify the appropriateness of 
affective integration and delineate affectively deeper and more robust integrations. As discussed 
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previously, there are a number of available routes here for the ExE defender—although there still 
lies some work ahead when it comes specifically to socially extended emotions. 
Finally, consider what might be called the mark of the emotions objection and which 
mirrors the mark of cognition objection against ExM (Adams and Aizawa, 2008; cf. Rupert, 
2009). According to this objection, we need an exact mark of cognition, one which is not derived 
from a priori conceptual analysis but rather provided by our best cognitive sciences; only such 
an empirical criterion will reliably distinguish entities that bear cognitive properties from those 
that are simply scaffolded by quasi-cognitive external props. The same might be required for 
emotions and one might then refer to developmental or social psychology or the affective 
neurosciences. However, the ExE defender might respond that it’s question-begging to 
exclusively define emotions a priori in terms of some subjective (intra-)bodily feeling aspect. 
Moreover, they might also help themselves to a family of philosophical arguments that 
“emotions do not form a natural class” (Rorty, 1978: 141; cf. Barrett 2006 for further empirical 
evidence). Accordingly, from the perspective of ExE, this might be sufficient to show that there 
are no natural properties or prefixed facts that could determine whether something is or is not an 
emotion (see, critically, Roberts, 2003). And most agree that it is even less plausible to specify 
what a given emotion, say anger or sadness, is without reference to the respective sociocultural 
context. As Colombetti and Roberts argue, it seems that ExE can proceed with explanatorily 
relevant claims even in the absence of a “theory-driven ‘mark of the affective’” (2015: 10).  
 
4. Conclusion and Future Research  
Discussions of ExE are still in their infancy—and metaphysical and empirical implications of 
ExE far from settled. However, what’s already clear is that ExE offers a strong challenge to 
internalist and individualistic assumptions that, until recently, have shaped philosophical and 
psychological treatments of emotions. Philosophy of emotions is presently a lively area of 
research (see Goldie 2010). ExE can potentially help move these debates forward by offering a 
fresh critical perspective on the ontology of emotions.   
As mentioned previously, future work on ExE should address pressing taxonomic 
considerations. This will involve not only specifying vehicles of emotional extension (material, 
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social, cultural, etc.), but also specifying which components of emotions (cognitive, experiential, 
etc.) and which types of emotions (moods, temperaments, bodily affects, etc.) might or might not 
be extended by these different vehicles. In particular, discussing the hitherto understudied role of 
cultural artifacts in scaffolding emotions, such as individual and shared narratives, collective 
memory and imagination, or the role of shared habits and norms in shaping so-called ‘emotional 
cultures’, will greatly enrich current debates.  
In light of its interdisciplinary approach, ExE is also poised to fruitfully supplement 
research in areas beyond philosophy. One such area is psychiatry and psychopathology. Drayson 
(2009) and Fuchs (2009) note that the recent embodied turn in philosophy of mind and cognitive 
offers ample theoretical resources for furthering our understanding of mental disorder. In 
particular, embodied cognitive science seems to challenge the metaphysical and epistemic 
reductionism behind the dominant biomedical model, according to which psychiatric disorders 
are best conceptualized (and treated) as brain disorders (Zachar, 2000). Some initial attempts 
have been made to indicate how ExM might impact issues of psychiatric taxonomy, diagnosis, 
and treatment (Davies, 2016; Sprevak, 2011). Instead of looking for the cause of mental 
disorders in specific brain regions or functions, ExM may instead compel us to see major 
psychiatric disorders—including the emotional disruptions characteristic of these disorders—as 
resulting from multidimensional breakdowns of the extended organism-environment loop. From 
the perspective of ExE and ExM, then, psychiatry would need to become an “ecological” 
enterprise in order to better grasp the interconnection of psychological, social, and 
pharmacological approaches adequate for its subject (Fuchs 2009: 232). ExM and ExE can make 
conceptual contributions necessary for developing such an ecological turn in psychiatry.     
ExE research might further broaden its impact by developing more overt political and 
cultural studies dimensions (Protevi, 2009). At present, work exploring prevalent negative, 
disrupting, and politically relevant phenomena in connection with socially extended emotions is 
still scarce. For instance, think of the pervasive and more often than not negative and intruding 
effects that corporate, organizational, or workplace scaffoldings have on regulating individual 
and group emotions. Using an apt metaphor, Slaby (2016) speaks of the “hacking” of 
individuals’ affective lives by corporate agents, who often frame and modulate individuals’ 
affective lives without their consent. Further potentially fruitful investigations in this context 
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might concern collaborative or organizational forms of irrationality and corresponding 
disruptions of emotional co-regulation. Here, too, various social scaffoldings are crucially 
contributing to these disruptions. For example, socio-psychological mechanisms such as the 
infamous groupthink (Janis, 1982), group polarization or choice shift in deliberative groups 
(Friedkin, 1999; Sunstein, 2002) or propaganda typically play a constitutive role in entering or 
maintaining practical irrationality, self-deception, or loss of affective control. And this, in turn, is 
often due precisely to their disruptive role on co-regulatory practices (misidentification of one’s 
own or one’s group’s shared emotions, biases on one’s own or a group’s affect control, etc.) (see 
Szanto, forthcoming b.). Here, placing ExE in dialogue with political philosophy, social choice 
and game theory, and recent sociology of emotions is likely to generate genuinely new insights 
and open up new areas for further research.5  
 
. 
 
 
  
                                                          
5 Michele Merritt has recently done related work on ExM and ExE in the context of gender (Merritt 2014) and eating 
disorder (Merritt forthcoming).  
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